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Abstract 
Although theories of information technology (IT) use have been widely researched, organizations 
continue to struggle with insufficiently utilizing their IT assets. Those interested in understanding 
and managing IT use need both novel theoretical development and new directions for future research. 
In this paper, we address both of these needs. Regarding the first need, we develop novel theory by 
explaining two types of cognitive processes—one fast and one slow—that underlie theories of IT 
use. The impetus for our explanation of underlying processes (EUP) comes from studies of IT use 
that have found moderating effects of previous interaction with IT. With these results, researchers 
have concluded that cognitions are less important in determining IT use as the use of that IT 
increases. Consistent with that conclusion, our EUP posits that, as learning from prior use occurs, 
the influence of fast, automatic, unconscious (type 1) cognitive processes increases while the 
influence decreases for slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) cognitive processes. Type 1 processes 
automatically generate a default type 1 response; type 2 processes have the potential to generate an 
intervening type 2 response. The intervention potential is highest for initial use of the target IT and 
lowest when learning is high such that use of the IT has become automatic. From our EUP, we 
develop three insights: 1) that the cognitions that lead to a default response are not necessarily the 
cognitions found in extant theories of IT use, 2) that both type 1 and type 2 processes are subject to 
bounded rationality, and 3) that the relationship between learning and the intervention potential for 
a type 2 response, although negative, may not be linear. To address the second need that we note 
above, we suggest new directions for future research, which includes investigating the cognitive 
control problem (i.e., when type 2 processes intervene) and exploring the effects of heuristics, 
nudges, and bounded rationality on decisions to use IT. Beyond the hope that the suggested directions 
for research will yield solutions for addressing the underutilization of IT assets, the fundamental 
advances in theoretical understanding that we present here suggest notable implications for practice, 
including developing brief, simple, cognitively unconscious messages directed at nudging decision 
makers toward a default response to use the target IT. 
Keywords: Information Technology Acceptance and Use, Theory of IT Use, Fast and Slow 
Processes, Dual-Process Theories, Type 1, Type 2, EUP, TAM, TPB, UTAUT, UTAUT2, 
Continuing Use of IT, Habitual Use of IT. 
Mike Chiasson was the accepting senior editor. This paper was submitted December 8, 2015 and went through two 
revisions.  
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1 Introduction 
 Although much research has examined the factors that 
affect the adoption and continued use of information 
technology (IT), organizations still have reason to be 
concerned about getting people to use IT to support 
their work. In discussing organizations’ “huge 
investments in information technology over the last 25 
years”, Jasperson, Carter, and Zmud (2005, p. 526) 
conclude that “existing evidence strongly suggests that 
organizations underutilize the functional potential of 
the majority of this mass of installed IT applications”. 
More recently, Veiga, Keupp, Floyd, and Kellermanns 
(2014) have reiterated concerns about underutilization 
of ERP systems in the business domain. Venkatesh, 
Zhang, and Sykes (2011, p. 524) note similar concerns 
beyond the business domain with healthcare systems. 
The fact that businesses continue to invest in ERP 
systems emphasizes the importance of these concerns; 
indeed, Scavo (2014) reports that ERP investment rates 
are the highest of over a dozen technologies. Similarly, 
substantial investments in electronic health records 
(EHR) by hospitals (Herman, 2014) further emphasize 
the importance of these concerns beyond the business 
domain. Understanding the underlying processes by 
which individuals move from adoption to continued 
use to automatic use would provide a foundation for 
addressing these concerns.  
A large body of research has focused on the use of IT; 
however, from reviewing this research, we found that 
research has not adequately explained the movement 
from initial use of specific IT functionality to 
continued use and beyond (e.g., automatic use of that 
functionality or use of additional functionality). We 
focus on providing that explanation and identifying 
new directions for future research, which should 
provide a basis for infusing this body of research with 
a new vitality. Inspired by Evans (2011, 2008), we 
describe the relationship of fast, automatic, 
unconscious (type 1) cognitive processes and slow, 
controlled, conscious (type 2) cognitive processes as 
IT use shifts from initial to continuing use and beyond. 
Type 1 processes provide a default response to use or 
not use a target IT. Type 2 processes may intervene to 
override or reinforce that response. We suggest factors 
that affect intervention by type 2 processes. We discuss 
how researchers may use our explanation of these fast 
and slow processes and resulting insights to provide 
new directions for research and point to immediate 
actions to address the underutilization of significant IT 
assets. 
Before explaining the fast and slow processes that 
underlie individuals’ decisions to use a target IT, we 
begin with needed clarifications in cognitive theories 
of IT use. First, we identify and address specific 
problems in the literature about the several constructs 
used to represent previous interaction with IT (namely, 
experience, prior use, and habit). Previous interaction 
with a target IT is a basis for learning, an important 
element of our explanation, so we need to address the 
noted problems. Next, we explain an inadequately 
developed implication of the moderating effect of 
previous interaction with IT, which serves as the 
impetus for the core of our explanation. As a brief 
preview, our theoretical elaboration is consistent with 
a common interpretation of the moderating effect of 
previous interaction with IT on the relationship 
between cognitions and use of IT. As Kim, Malhotra, 
and Narasimhan (2005) and Limayem, Hirt, and 
Cheung (2007) report, cognitions have a decreasing 
influence on IT use as previous interaction with IT 
increases. This moderating effect reflects learning. 
Moreover, our EUP is also consistent with a less 
clearly developed implication of the moderating effect 
of previous interaction: conscious and automatic 
processes jointly occur in an individual. This latter 
implication contrasts with an espoused alternative 
view that such processes do not occur simultaneously 
in individual users (Kim and Malhotra, 2005, p. 746). 
However, since this latter implication that both 
conscious and automatic processes jointly occur is a 
logical extension of a moderating effect, which we 
discuss later, the logic of our theoretical elaboration is 
more persuasive than the espoused alternative view. 
After more fully developing and addressing the need 
for clarification of use-related constructs and an 
inadequately developed implication of the moderating 
effect of previous interaction with IT, we focus on 
developing the core of our contribution: that is, we 
focus on explaining the underlying type 1 and type 2 
processes and their relationship along the continuum of 
IT use from 1) initial use to 2) continuing use to 3) 
automatic use. As part of our explanation, we introduce 
the cognitive control problem, which deals with the 
question of when slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) 
processes intervene to reinforce or override the default 
fast, automatic, unconscious (type 1) response. We 
present four scenarios to illuminate when type 2 
processes intervene. We then discuss how our EUP 
relates to selected prior research. Finally, we discuss 
future research opportunities and implications for 
practice. This discussion directly addresses the 
underutilization of significant IT assets by focusing on 
concerns about getting people to use IT more fully to 
support their work whether in business, health care, or 
other domains. 
A preview of essential elements of our EUP and related 
insights includes: 
• Learning, from prior decisions to use IT and from 
actual use of the IT, is incorporated into type 1 and 
type 2 processes and related cognitions. 
• Cognitions that lead to a default type 1 response 
are not necessarily the cognitions found in extant 
cognitive theories of IT use. 
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• Slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) cognitive 
processes are more likely to intervene to reinforce 
or override the default fast, automatic, 
unconscious (type 1) cognitive response when 
there is little or no learning from prior use of the 
target IT (which includes similar IT) or related 
instruction. Thus, type 2 processes are dominant 
over type 1 processes when there is little or no 
prior use of the target IT. 
• Type 2 processes are less likely to intervene to 
reinforce or override the default type 1 response as 
learning occurs. Thus, the influence of type 2 
processes decreases as learning occurs. 
•  Type 2 processes are basically unlikely to 
intervene to reinforce or override the default type 
1 response when high learning has occurred from 
prior use of IT. Thus, type 1 processes dominate 
type 2 processes when extensive learning has 
occurred. 
• In the cognitive control problem, intervention 
potential represents the likelihood that type 2 
processes will intervene. When the intervention 
potential is high enough (i.e., exceeds the 
intervention threshold), type 2 processes 
intervene. The relationship between extent of 
learning (or prior use) and intervention potential, 
however, may not be linear. 
• Both type 1 and type 2 processes are subject to 
bounded rationality. 
We develop the essential elements of our EUP and 
related insights in the sections that follow. We build on 
those elements and insights to discuss how our work 
relates to prior research and develop suggestions for 
future research and practice. 
2 Need for Clarifications in 
Cognitive Theories of IT Use 
Much work has focused on initial acceptance and use 
of information technology (IT). For example, 
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003) review 
eight theories that have been prominent in the 
literature. Beyond that literature, works have emerged 
that include a focus on understanding continuing IT 
use, including automatic use (e.g., Bhattacherjee, 
2001; Jasperson et al., 2005; Karahanna, Straub, & 
Cherveny, 1999; Kim & Malhotra, 2005; Kim et al., 
2005; Limayem et al., 2007; Wu & Kuo, 2008; Kim, 
2009; Ortiz de Guinea & Markus, 2009; Venkatesh, 
Thong, & Xu, 2012; Polites & Karahanna, 2012, 2013; 
Setterstrom, Pearson, & Orwig, 2013; Lowry, Gaskin, 
& Moody, 2015; Xu, Abdinnour, & Chaparro, 2017).  
To explain continuing use, researchers have 
supplemented cognitive-based explanations of initial 
acceptance of IT, such as the technology acceptance 
model (TAM) (Davis, 1989), the theory of planned 
behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991), and the unified theory 
of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) 
(Venkatesh et al., 2003), with use-related constructs—
experience, prior use, and habit (e.g., Limayem et al., 
2007; Kim, 2009; Venkatesh et al., 2012). Some 
researchers have studied initial acceptance and use as 
well as continuing IT use (e.g., Aggarwal, Kryscynski, 
Midha, & Singh, 2015; Benlian, 2015; Sun, Fang, & 
Zou, 2016). Generally, these works propose that 
continuing IT use is based on both: 
1. Cognitions, such as perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use (from TAM); attitudes, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
control (from TPB); and performance expectancy, 
effort expectancy, social influence, and 
facilitating conditions (from UTAUT); and 
2. A user’s previous interaction with the IT.  
Researchers have incorporated additional constructs 
beyond those in TAM, TPB, and UTAUT into other 
models that explain IT use, such as enjoyment (Van der 
Heijden, 2004; Xu et al., 2017), social networks 
(Sykes, Venkatesh, & Gosain, 2009), co-worker advice 
(Robert & Sykes, 2017), emotions (Beaudry & 
Pinsonneault, 2010; Stein, Newell, Wagner, & 
Galliers, 2015), and mindfulness of technology in 
conjunction with task-technology fit (Sun et al., 2016). 
From reviewing research that has examined or 
extended UTAUT or integrated it with other 
theoretical frameworks, Venkatesh, Thong, and Xu 
(2016) propose a revised model of technology 
acceptance and use that includes main effects from 
UTAUT and UTAUT2 (an extension to UTAUT by 
Venkatesh et al. (2012)) and individual and higher-
level contextual factors. However, these additional 
constructs, extensions, integrations with other 
theoretical frameworks, and contextual factors do not 
change the role of cognitions and, where included, 
previous interaction with the IT.  
Since the several constructs used to represent previous 
interaction with IT—experience, prior use, and habit—
can create confusion, we discuss those use-related 
constructs next and suggest some clarifications. 
Subsequently, we argue against the view that 
conscious and automatic processes do not occur 
simultaneously in an individual. This logically 
inconsistent interpretation of the moderating effect of 
previous interaction with IT led us to develop our 
explanation of the processes that underlie the decision 
to use IT. 
2.1 Use-related Constructs 
Although the literature has a variety of 
conceptualizations of system use (Burton-Jones & 
Straub 2006) and has conceptualized user behavior 
more broadly than system use (Beaudry & 
Pinsonneault, 2005), researchers have used three use-
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related constructs—experience, prior use, and habit—
in studies with previous system use. These variations 
on previous system use have implications for learning 
and the influence of underlying fast and slow 
processes. We discuss each construct below. 
In presenting UTAUT2, Venkatesh et al. (2012, p. 161) 
describe experience as the “opportunity to use a target 
technology” that “is typically operationalized as the 
passage of time from the initial use of a technology by 
an individual”. If one follows Venkatesh et al.’s (2012) 
conceptual and operational definitions, experience 
does not represent interaction with the IT; rather, it 
represents only the opportunity to interact with a 
specific technology. For some individuals, that 
opportunity could mean that they interacted to a great 
extent and learned a great deal about the IT. For others, 
who had the same opportunity, it could mean that they 
had little or no interaction and learned nothing. As a 
result, defining experience as Venkatesh et al. (2012) 
do has a significant limitation. Those defining 
experience in this way must clearly explain how this 
version makes an interpretable contribution to 
understanding IT use.  
Others have conceptually defined experience to 
include more than just an opportunity to interact with 
the technology. For example, Thompson, Higgins, and 
Howell (1994) refer to experience conceptually as past 
use of IT (e.g., use of a spreadsheet), which makes 
experience similar to prior use (see below). To limit 
confusion when including experience in a study of IT 
use, we suggest clearly specifying its conceptual and 
operational definitions and referencing other works 
that are consistent with those definitions to help situate 
the work in the literature.  
Prior use, also called past use or past usage, has been a 
construct in various studies (e.g., Kim & Malhotra, 
2005; Kim et al., 2005; Wu & Kuo, 2008; Kim, 2009). 
Typically, prior use is a single-dimensional construct 
that reflects the extent of the user’s previous 
interaction with a specific IT. Kim et al. (2005) use a 
two-item measure that reflects the extent of a user’s 
interaction with the IT (in this case, frequency and 
duration of use). 
Variations on prior use that rely on frequency or extent 
of a user’s previous interaction with a specific IT 
include both extended use and proficient use. Extended 
use “refers to using more of the technology’s features 
to support an individual’s task performance” (Hsieh & 
Wang, 2007, p. 217; similarly, see Benlian, 2015). 
Veiga et al. (2014, p. 694), in effect, build on extended 
use in operationalizing proficient use as the “extent to 
which individuals fully utilize the core, integrative 
applications within a specific software platform that 
are designed and intended to enhance their 
performance on essential, job-related tasks”. Others 
have referred to deep structure use rather than 
proficient use (e.g., Robert & Sykes, 2017). 
We offer several suggestions regarding prior use. First, 
we suggest using the extent of the user’s interaction 
with the IT for the definitions of both 1) prior use and 
2) use of technology since these use-related constructs 
represent the same behavior just at different times. We 
also suggest that, when the extent of learning, 
expertise, or proficiency regarding the IT is 
appropriate for a study, researchers should consider 
including that construct explicitly or represent it via 
prior use and its moderating effect. Finally, note that 
prior use can take on values over a wide range of 
previous interaction with IT—from none to highly 
extensive for a specific application or an extended set 
of features or applications. Thus, prior use can be used 
in theories that explain both initial use, where prior use 
is none, and continuing use, where prior use could vary 
from very little to highly extensive. 
Habit is the most complex of the three use-related 
constructs. A recent, multi-dimensional definition of 
habit comes from Polites and Karahanna (2013, p. 224; 
2012, p. 25): “learned sequences of acts that have 
become automatic responses to specific cues and are 
functional in obtaining certain goals or end-states”. In 
their work, habit has: 
Four dimensions of intentionality, awareness, 
controllability, and mental efficiency…. 
Intentionality does not refer to planned or 
conscious decisions to take action…as 
intention has been defined in both the 
psychology and IS literature.... Rather, habits 
are intentional in that they are functional or 
goal-oriented in nature. Nevertheless, habits 
occur outside of awareness, in that the 
individual may be unaware of the situational 
trigger leading them to perform the behavior, 
or unaware of how the trigger is interpreted 
at the moment it occurs.… Further, habits are 
difficult to control, in that it may be difficult 
to resist the urge to perform a task in a 
particular way, especially if it is part of a 
larger automatized work routine. Finally, 
habits are mentally efficient, meaning that 
they free the individual’s attentional 
resources to do other things at the same 
time…. (emphasis in original) (Polites & 
Karahanna, 2013, p. 224) 
Others focus on limited dimensions of this definition, 
particularly awareness. For example, Limayem et al. 
(2007, p. 709) refer to habit as a mind-set and define 
IS habit as “the extent to which people tend to perform 
behaviors (use IS) automatically because of learning”. 
Given the multi-dimensional definition of habit, we 
suggest that researchers who rely on limited 
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dimensions clarify and justify the dimensions that they 
focus on. 
2.2 Interpreting the Moderating Effect 
of Previous Interaction with IT 
We begin our discussion of the moderating effect of 
previous interaction with IT by explaining the model 
in Figure 1. It shows a generic reason-based model 
supplemented with a generic use-related construct, 
“past behavior”, which represents specific use-related 
constructs that previous studies have employed. This 
model shows that past behavior affects various 
cognitions and continued use. It shows that various 
cognitions mediate the effects of past behavior on 
continued use and that past behavior moderates the 
effect of various cognitions on their consequences. 
Examples of cognitions other than intention to use 
technology include attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control from TPB. 
 
Figure 1. A Model of Technology Use with Cognitions 
and Past Behavior 
Graphical models such as Figure 1 can often be 
represented with a corresponding estimated statistical 
model. For example, consider a model that could 
represent the portion of Figure 1 that has intention to 
use target IT (INT) and past behavior with target IT 
(PAST) jointly influencing use of target IT (USE): 
USE = b0 +b1*INT +b2*PAST + 
b3*INT*PAST (1) 
Focusing on this portion of the model in Figure 1 
allows one to discuss essential features of theories of 
IT use across the continuum of IT use. For initial use, 
only intention affects use since there is no past 
behavior (PAST = 0), which makes the last two terms 
in Equation 1 each equal 0. With those terms equal 0, 
the implication is that b1 > 0 such that, as intention 
increases, use increases. The moderating effect of past 
behavior, which the interaction term (b3*INT*PAST) 
represents, applies to continued and automatic use 
when past behavior is greater than zero.  
Moderating effects reflect learning. As past behavior 
increases, learning occurs through repetition. The 
influence of cognitions decreases as past behavior and 
learning increase. As learning occurs, behavior 
becomes more routine, which means that conscious 
processing of cognitions becomes less influential. At 
the ultimate level of learning, a learned sequence of 
acts is automatically evoked in response to specific 
cues. If this explanation of learning is valid and the 
moderating effect (b3*INT*PAST) in Equation 1 
appropriately represents it, b3 will be negative as Kim 
and Malhotra (2005) found. Notice that, as past 
behavior increases, the negative value of b3 indicates 
that the influence of intention (a cognition) on IT use 
decreases. To reiterate, this decrease in influence that 
a negative b3 shows (i.e., this moderating effect of past 
behavior on the relationship between intention and use 
of technology) reflects learning.  
A common implication of this moderating effect is that 
automatic behavior, at the right end of the continuum 
of technology use, involves no cognitive processes or, 
at least, no conscious processing. For example, Kim et 
al. (2005, p. 420) state that “as past use increases, 
automatic processing displaces conscious processing, 
and in this automatic mode, evaluations/intention will 
no longer exert their effects on subsequent use”. 
Venkatesh et al. (2012, p. 164) note that, once behavior 
has become automatic, “being in a similar situation is 
sufficient to trigger the automatic response without 
conscious cognitive mediation (i.e., attitude or 
intention)”. Similarly, given that behavior has become 
automatic, Limayem et al. (2007, p. 719) state that 
“cognitive processing is not required…on 
encountering the relevant environmental cue(s)”.  
Explanations that cognitions or conscious processing 
do not affect automatic behavior are consistent with the 
interpretation of moderating effects as represented in 
Equation 1. To illustrate with a slight re-arrangement 
of terms from Equation 1, the influence of intention on 
technology use is (b1 + PAST*b3)*INT. At the right 
end of the continuum of technology use is automatic 
behavior, where intentions “no longer exert their 
effects on subsequent use” (i.e., where the ultimate 
level of learning has occurred such that behavior is 
automatic). That is where the coefficient of INT equals 
zero.  
We use Equation 1 illustratively here to discuss 
essential features of theories of IT use across the 
continuum of IT use. If the theory and assumptions 
hold and the statistical model adequately represents the 
theory, then an empirical test of the theory should 
support the hypothesized relationships. For example, 
the theory could be that use increases with greater 
intention, but learning reduces the effect of intention 
on use. An assumption could be that the context is 
stable. The portions of the statistical model that 
represent the theory could be b1*INT (for the effect of 
intention on use) and b3*INT*PAST (for the effect of 
learning; that is, the moderating effect of past 
behavior). An empirical test that supports the theory 
would find b1 > 0 and b3 < 0. 
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2.3 Learning from Previous Interaction 
with IT: Problem with Prior 
Research 
When an individual moves toward automatic behavior, 
the moderating effect of previous interaction with IT 
has an important implication that the literature has not 
clearly developed. Specifically, after initial use but 
prior to fully automatic use, a changing mix of 
conscious cognitive processing and unconscious (i.e., 
automatic) cognitive processing must jointly 
determine use of IT. Others implicitly recognize this 
shifting mix, but they do not explicitly recognize or 
explain the underlying processes. For example, 
Limayem et al. (2007, p. 719) explain: 
As a consequence of repeating the same 
behavior successfully over and over again, 
the increasing automaticity of the behavior 
suppresses, more and more, the need to 
engage in active cognitive processing 
[citation omitted]. In the extreme, this 
process continues until it reaches a point 
where intention no longer exerts any 
influence on the behavior. 
Although not necessarily obvious, this explanation 
implicitly means that, with repetition but before 
behavior becomes fully automatic, conscious cognitive 
processing does not fully determine use of IT. To some 
extent, automatic processes suppress conscious 
cognitive processing in determining use of IT. That 
partial suppression means that conscious cognitive 
processes play some part of the role in determining use 
of IT and that, for that same decision, automatic, 
unconscious processes play the other part.  
Even though Kim et al. (2005, p. 420) state that “as 
past use increases, automatic processing displaces 
conscious processing, and in this automatic mode, 
evaluations/intention will no longer exert their effects 
on subsequent use”, they do not recognize the logical 
implication that both conscious cognitive and 
unconscious automatic processes influence an 
individual’s decision to use IT between initial and 
automatic use of IT. Specifically, Kim and Malhotra 
(2005, p. 746) state: “Note that we do not expect an 
individual user to follow both conscious and automatic 
processes simultaneously”. Limayem et al. (2007) do 
not explicitly comment on this fundamental, but not 
necessarily obvious, logical inconsistency that Kim 
and Malhotra espouse. Neither do Venkatesh et al. 
(2012) nor any other researchers whose work we have 
examined. Thus, we need to address this inconsistency 
and lack of clear theoretical explanation of the 
underlying processes. 
Previous interaction with the IT influences the future 
use of the IT, which Figure 1 illustrates via the 
mediated and moderating effects of past behavior. The 
mediated effects operate through cognitions. As one 
can see from our discussion above, the effects of 
cognitions in conjunction with use-related constructs 
(namely, the moderating effects of past behavior 
illustrated in Figure 1) have been the subject of much 
study and discussion (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2012; 
Limayem et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2005). The major 
thrust of the moderating effects that guide our work is 
that greater past behavior reduces the strength of the 
relationship between cognitions and intention and 
between intention and use. These moderating effects 
occur because of the effects of learning based on 
repeated system use.  
In our theoretical clarification, we focus on the 
underlying processes that occur any time a decision to 
use IT occurs (i.e., all along the continuum of IT use 
from initial use to continuing use to automatic use). 
These underlying processes are useful in explaining 
the moderating effects that we note above. Empirical 
evidence establishes that increasing use of the 
technology lessens the effect of intention (e.g., Kim et 
al., 2005; Limayem et al., 2007). Kim et al.’s (2005) 
and Kim and Malhotra’s (2005) explanations of this 
moderating effect provide a basis for further 
discussion.  
Kim et al. (2005, p. 431) characterize their 
explanations as highlighting “the role of 
habit/automaticity as an underlying mechanism 
shifting from conscious processing to automatic 
processing”. The habit/automaticity perspective 
(HAP): 
Maintains that conscious behavior is 
characterized by the mental representation of 
why-, what-, and how-level goals and their 
corresponding links. However, with 
repetition of the same behavior over time, the 
same set of mental links tends to be 
repetitively formulated. In such a routinized 
situation, the knowledge structure linking 
situational cues and a subsequent action 
becomes hard wired in the mental 
representation. As a result, IT use occurs 
automatically without the process of 
establishing associated goals…. In IS 
research, this “ingrained cognitive script” is 
assumed to activate subsequent use 
automatically without requiring conscious 
processing…. [A]s past use increases, 
automatic processing displaces conscious 
processing, and in this automatic mode, 
evaluations/intention will no longer exert 
their effects on subsequent use. (Kim et al., 
2005, pp. 419-420) 
In the instant activation perspective (IAP), an 
alternative to HAP: 
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Conscious processing would involve the 
formation of judgments and intention, and 
that with repeated performance, such 
cognitions would become stabilized and 
ultimately stored in memory. However, 
contrary to HAP, Ajzen (2002) maintains that 
the stored judgments and intention would be 
“instantly activated” in a routine 
environment and thereby guide subsequent 
behavior. (Kim et al., 2005, p. 420) 
Based on their statistical finding of the moderating 
effect of prior use, which reduced the effect of 
cognitions on behavior with increasing prior use, Kim 
et al. (2005, p. 428) conclude that HAP, rather than 
IAP, is an appropriate view of user behavior. Kim and 
Malhotra (2005, p. 746) elaborate: 
System usage will be driven by conscious 
intention when the linkage between stimuli 
and action is not fully developed. However, 
once IS use becomes routine—performed 
frequently in a stable environment—past use 
is likely to be a good proxy for habit and a 
reliable predictor of future use…. Note that 
we do not expect an individual user to follow 
both conscious and automatic processes 
simultaneously. 
Although Kim et al. (2005) focus on comparing HAP 
and IAP as explanations of automatic behavior rather 
than the entire continuum of IT use, their explanation 
could imply an abrupt shift from cognitive to automatic 
processes for individuals completing the shift to 
automatic use. According to their explanation, 
automatic processes play no role in determining use of 
IT until the automatic processes are fully developed. 
Our explanation of the underlying processes addresses 
this problem in the literature and clarifies that this shift 
is not an abrupt step function. At the extremes, 
automatic use contrasts with slower, controlled, 
conscious use that occurs with first-time use. In 
between is where, over time, the shift occurs due to 
learning. Our explanation entails a shift that involves 
both conscious and automatic processes operating 
jointly in an individual user. 
3 Explanation of Processes that 
Underlie Decisions to Use IT 
The core of our theoretical explanation focuses on 
clarifying the processes underlying an individual’s 
potential movement from initial IT use through 
continued use to automatic use. In the sections that 
follow, we present various layers of our EUP with the 
assistance of three figures, which graphically depict 
the EUP from different perspectives. In the first layer, 
we explain the underlying type 1 and type 2 processes, 
their relationship along the continuum of IT use, and 
the role of learning. Given these basic elements of our 
explanation, we then explain the cognitive control 
problem, which concerns whether default type 1 or 
intervening type 2 processes control the individual’s 
decision to use IT. We use four scenarios to illustrate 
when type 2 processes intervene and then further 
elaborate on the cognitive control problem. We 
conclude our explanation of processes underlying 
decisions to use IT by briefly relating our EUP to two 
other theories in the literature: the elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM) and self-regulation. 
To explain the shift from slower to automatic cognitive 
processes that determine use of technology, we found 
inspiration from Evans (2011, 2008). His discussion of 
dual-process theories of reasoning refers to two 
specific types of cognitive processes, type 1 and type 
2. Type 1 processes are fast, automatic, and 
unconscious. They produce a default response. Type 2 
processes are slow, controlled, and conscious. They 
may intervene to reinforce or override the default type 
1 response. Evans (2011) refers to the determination of 
when to intervene as the cognitive control problem. 
While we mostly discuss this problem in the next 
section, we note here that, at initial use of a target IT, 
type 2 processes are more likely to intervene, which 
makes them dominant; as learning increases, type 2 
processes are less likely to intervene such that the 
influence of type 1 processes increases. Type 2 
processes require access to a single, capacity-limited 
central working memory resource; type 1 processes do 
not.  
Consider the following explanation of how underlying 
cognitive processes determine IT system use and their 
relationship over the continuum of IT use (see Figure 
2). It is the first explanation in the literature we know 
of that is explicitly based on a shift from a dominance 
by type 2 cognitive processes (slow, controlled, 
conscious) to increasing influence of type 1 cognitive 
processes (fast, automatic, unconscious) as use and 
learning increase. Contrary to other explanations (e.g., 
Kim & Malhotra, 2005), type 1 and type 2 processes 
work in tandem as influence shifts from type 2 to type 
1 processing. Compared to distinctly different 
explanations of novel IT use and automatic IT use, the 
shift from type 2 to type 1 processes offers a single 
logical explanation for the movement from novel IT 
use to continuing use to automatic IT use. The 
explanation spans initial IT use and post-adoption (or 
repeated/continued and even automatic) IT use. The 
major cause of the shift in influence is learning that 
results from repetition of both 1) the decision behavior 
that determines IT use and 2) IT system use behavior. 
For a novel IT, no system use has occurred (assuming 
the novel IT is not similar to any other system use), so 
no learning has occurred directly related to decision 
behavior determining use of that novel IT or the 
behavior of using that IT (see the left side of Figure 2). 
Building on Evans (2011, 2008), type 1 processes—
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fast, automatic, and unconscious—are relatively 
undeveloped since no learning regarding the novel IT 
system has occurred. The type 1 processes evoke 
cognitions associated with environmental cues based 
on the individual’s general history (i.e., other past 
behavior), but they are not directly related to using the 
novel IT.  
Type 2 processes—slow, controlled, and conscious—
intervene and dominate type 1 processes, which are 
limited at this point (e.g., supplying relevant content, 
such as assumptions from other past behavior, into 
working memory). Using the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991) for illustrative purposes, an 
individual cognitively combines attitude, subjective 
norm, and perceived behavioral control regarding the 
target IT to obtain an intention to use the IT; in 
addition, the individual cognitively combines intention 
and perceived behavioral control to determine use of 
that IT. Because these cognitive processes occur for 
the first time with a novel IT, the initial cognitions are 
estimates that may be inaccurate and, thus, have 
uncertainty. It takes the individual time to have these 
estimates ready for processing. The process of 
combining them is a novel process that takes more time 
than if the process were familiar. Altogether, the 
mental effort to process these cognitions fits the 
characteristics of type 2 processes—slow, controlled, 
and conscious.
 
Figure 2. The Shift in Influence of Processes as Learning Occurs 
As learning occurs via continued IT use, a shift in the 
influence of type 1 and type 2 processes reflects the 
effect of learning (see the middle of Figure 2). Mental 
efficiency in processing cognitions increases as 
learning occurs, which reduces demand on the 
capacity-limited central working memory resource. 
Estimates of the cognitions are likely to become more 
accurate and, thus, more certain, which makes 
processing simpler. Also, in contrast with initial IT 
use, repeated IT use makes estimates of cognitions 
(e.g., attitude, subjective norm, and perceived 
behavioral control) more readily available for 
processing. They are no longer novel but have been 
accessed previously and updated via learning from IT 
use.  
Besides learning via repeated IT use leading to better 
estimates, faster access, and faster processing of 
cognitions, repeated IT use also allows the individual 
to learn to use the IT system more efficiently. Learning 
the IT system functional capabilities and the 
procedures or routines to use those capabilities (i.e., 
becoming more expert in using the IT) increases with 
deliberate practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-
Romer, 1993).  
As learning increases with 1) additional episodes that 
evoke decision behavior to use a specific IT system and 
2) practice with using the IT system, mental efficiency 
in the decision to use the system is reflected in an 
individual’s developing simpler procedures for 
processing learning-refined cognitions to determine 
continuing IT use. With repeated situational cues that 
evoke repeated decisions regarding continuing IT use, 
the individual accesses and processes the learned 
cognitions and learning-refined processing rules for 
determining IT use faster, more automatically, and 
with less consciousness. As Figure 2 shows, this shift 
to faster, more automatic, and less conscious decision 
making occurs as learning increases; that is, type 1 
processes increase in influence while type 2 processes 
decrease in influence.  
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When learning has reached a level that supports 
automatic behavior, the effect of the learning that has 
occurred via repeated decisions and use of the IT 
system is reflected in a shift to type 1 processes 
dominating the decision process (see the right side of 
Figure 2). Thus, processes for accessing and 
processing cognitions are fast, automatic, and 
unconscious. At this learning level, both decision and 
system use behaviors are habitual behavior. The 
individual makes the decision to use a specific IT 
system intentionally (i.e., directed at achieving a 
function or goal), unconsciously, automatically, and 
efficiently.  
Our explanation of the underlying process for 
determining initial, continuing, and automated use of 
an IT system focuses on the effect of learning on the 
decision to use IT. It is not experience, prior use, or 
habit that is the causal factor determining IT use; 
rather, it is learning. Learning occurs as the individual 
goes through type 1 and type 2 processes to decide 
whether to use an IT system. This learning leads to 
changes in the type 1 and type 2 processes and 
associated cognitions, which then affects decision 
making when the individual encounters the next 
similar decision to use the target IT system. With 
repeated use, these changes result in greater efficiency 
in accessing and processing cognitions. This greater 
efficiency results in the increasing influence of type 1 
processes and the reduced influence of type 2 
processes. 
As the individual engages in IT system use behavior, 
learning beyond the learning from repeated decisions 
to use IT also occurs. This learning via IT system use 
includes updates of cognitions regarding use of the IT 
that make them more accurate and more certain. 
Learning also includes improved recognition 
(conscious or unconscious) of situational cues, more 
complete knowledge of the IT’s functional capabilities 
and outcomes associated with use, and the 
development of efficient behavioral routines for IT 
use.  
Figure 3 supplements Figure 2’s view of the 
relationship of type 1 and type 2 processes. The 
addition of “other past behavior” recognizes that initial 
cognitions about the novel IT come not from past 
behavior with the target IT but from the individual’s 
general history. In effect, omitting type 1 processes and 
other past behavior from Figure 3 would yield a figure 
that corresponds conceptually with Figure 1 and extant 
theories that incorporate past behavior. Instead of 
using the moderating effects of past behavior to reflect 
learning as in Figure 1, Figure 3 represents learning 
directly through feedback from 1) the decision to use 
the target IT and 2) use of the target IT.
 
 
Figure 3. Fast and Slow Processes Underlying Theories of IT Use1 
                                                     
1 See Figures 2 and 4 for additional perspectives; the default type 1 response determines use of technology unless type 2 cognitive processes 
intervene. For first-time use, general history (i.e., other past behavior) influences type 1 and type 2 cognitive processes; for continuing and automatic 
use, past behavior with target IT influences type 1 and type 2 cognitive processes. Long- and short-dashed lines represent learning from decision to 
use IT and use of target IT, respectively; given the inclusion of learning, we do not include the moderating effects of past behavior (see Figure 1) 
here. 
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Given the explanation of the type 1 and type 2 
processes and the learning associated with decisions to 
use IT and with actual use of IT, we state an essential 
element of our EUP as: 
Type 1 and type 2 processes and related 
cognitions incorporate learning from prior 
decisions to use IT and from actual use of IT. 
We note several other essential elements and related 
insights from our EUP as we present scenarios that 
illuminate when type 2 processes intervene to override 
or reinforce default type 1 responses and further 
explain the cognitive control problem. 
3.1 Further Clarification: The 
Cognitive Control Problem 
Evans (2011) presents a default-interventionist dual-
process theorist’s explanation of the way type 2 and 
type 1 processes work together. Type 1 processing 
produces a rapid and intuitive default response. 
Slower, deliberative type 2 processing may intervene.  
A major question is: “When will type 2 processing 
intervene?” In Figure 3, that question corresponds to 
asking: “When will the default response generated by 
type 1 processes govern use of the target IT, and when 
will an intervention by type 2 processes govern use of 
the target IT?”. Evans (2011) refers to this question as 
the cognitive control problem. He identifies two high-
level factors—motivation and cognitive resources—
that affect cognitive control. Among the motivational 
factors, he includes instructions that guide the 
individual to make the decision and the individual’s 
confidence in an intuitive decision or feeling how right 
it is. Among the cognitive resources, he includes time 
and working memory, which are limited due to the 
demands of competing tasks (i.e., bounded rationality 
applies). We use these examples of factors with four 
scenarios to illustrate when type 2 processes intervene. 
3.1.1 Context of the Four Scenarios 
The four scenarios we present have two types of 
individuals: a newly hired sales associate and an 
experienced sales associate. They have the 
responsibility to complete a variety of tasks in a fast-
paced environment, such as taking orders from 
customers, filling those orders, checking and 
reordering inventory, obtaining customer feedback, 
and providing input for product design. The IT for 
these tasks varies in the following areas: functional 
support, shortcuts built into the IT for those with 
greater IT expertise, training and help built into the IT 
to facilitate task completion or develop expertise; in 
addition, training and help that the organization 
provides varies. The newly hired sales associate has 
received organizational instruction on using the IT but 
only for taking a normal sales order. The experienced 
sales associate takes normal and unusual sales orders 
routinely using the IT but has learned only the basics 
of some of the other IT and has not learned to use the 
IT for providing input for product design. 
3.1.2 Scenario 1: Newly Hired Sales 
Associate Takes the First Order 
On the continuum of initial use to automatic use of any 
of the IT that supports sales associates, this person is 
on the left end of the continuum toward initial use. 
When taking the first sales order, assume that the sales 
associate’s default response from type 1 processes was 
not to use the IT to enter the order. Assume further that 
the instruction on taking a sales order emphasized that 
using the IT was the best alternative for taking the 
order. The influence of the instruction on this sales 
associate suggests that type 2 processes would 
intervene. Moreover, the sales associate’s confidence 
in the intuitive decision not to use the IT would be 
limited by no prior context that would reinforce that 
intuition. In other words, the associate would not feel 
right in not using the IT, which suggests that type 2 
processes would intervene even though the fast pace of 
work and the demands on working memory of the sales 
associate’s new work tasks would limit the time and 
working memory capacity for type 2 processes to 
intervene. 
3.1.3 Scenario 2: Newly Hired Sales 
Associate Encounters an Unusual 
Order 
After additional training and a little use of the IT, 
assume that the sales associate’s default response from 
type 1 processes changed to use the IT to take orders 
and that the sales associate was in the process of taking 
an order when an unusual aspect of the order occurred. 
Assume further that the sales associate’s default 
response from type 1 processes was not to use the IT 
for the unusual aspect of this order. Further assume that 
the training had included steps for using the IT with 
unusual aspects of orders, including, for example, 
asking for assistance from another sales associate. That 
may make the sales associate more confident in using 
the IT, which suggests that type 2 processes intervene. 
As in the first scenario, the fast pace of work and the 
demands on working memory of the sales associate’s 
new work tasks would limit the time and working 
memory capacity for type 2 processes to intervene; 
however, the sales associate’s limited history of use 
could have led to some limited learning to cope with 
the pace and demands, which would have effectively 
modestly increased the associate’s time and working 
memory. Taken together, these examples of the factors 
that affect cognitive control in this scenario suggest 
that the associate would exercise type 2 processes to 
control the decision to use IT for the unusual aspect of 
taking the order. The associate would use slower, more 
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controlled, conscious type 2 processes to determine 
whether to use the IT at this point. 
3.1.4 Scenario 3: Experienced Sales 
Associate Takes an Order 
This person is on the right end of the continuum of 
initial use to automatic use of IT for this task. The 
default type 1 response to the task of taking an order is 
to use the associated IT. Unless some unusual event 
occurs in the task environment, the type 1 response to 
use the IT is invoked. Type 1 processes dominate type 
2 processes. Taking an order by using the IT is habitual 
with this sales associate. Presented with the cues for 
taking an order, the response is automatic. 
3.1.5 Scenario 4: Experienced Sales 
Associate Checks Inventory 
Although an automatic user of IT for taking an order, 
this sales associate has learned only the basics of using 
the IT for taking physical inventory. The default type 
1 response to the task of taking inventory is to use the 
basic IT rather than the IT with greater functionality 
that would complete the task with less work and time 
but would take time to learn. Even though training is 
available, the sales associate is confident in the default 
type 1 response, which suggests that type 2 processes 
do not intervene. Furthermore, the fast pace of work 
and the demands on working memory of the sales 
associate’s other work tasks indicate that there would 
be little time and working memory capacity for type 2 
processes to intervene. The intervention of type 2 
processes is likely to occur, however, if there were 
explicit instructions that significantly encouraged the 
individual to learn the greater functionality of the IT, 
changes that increased the individual’s confidence in 
learning and using that IT in the current constraints of 
the job, or other changes that effectively increased the 
individual’s time and working memory to make it 
feasible for that individual to consider learning and 
using the greater functionality of the IT. 
These scenarios illustrate factors that affect the 
cognitive control problem (i.e., the potential 
intervention of type 2 processes after a default type 1 
response to a situation in which a decision to use IT 
occurs). One could also include other specific factors 
beyond those that we illustrate, such as the importance 
of the decision. In these scenarios, an unusually large 
order could exemplify a very important decision. 
Rather than a factor that affects the intervention of type 
2 processes, such an order could represent a change in 
the environment or task cues that would disrupt an 
automatic default type 1 response for a routine sales 
order by presenting a different decision situation. In 
any case, we do not suggest that we provide an 
exhaustive list of factors that affect the cognitive 
control problem; however, the illustrated factors 
provide a starting point for future research.  
The default type 1 response occurs quickly and without 
conscious deliberation. As Shleifer (2012, p. 1089) 
notes when reflecting on Kahneman (2011) (a default-
interventionist dual-process theorist who refers to 
system 1 and 2 rather than type 1 and 2 processes): 
The main lesson I learned is that we represent 
problems in our minds, quickly and 
automatically, before we solve them. Such 
representation is governed by System 1 [type 
1] thinking, including involuntary attention 
drawn to particular features of the 
environment, focus on these features, and 
recall from memory of data associated with 
these perceptions. Perhaps the fundamental 
feature of System 1 [type 1] is that what we 
focus on, and what we recall is not always 
what is most necessary or needed for optimal 
decision making. Some critical information is 
ignored; other—less relevant—information 
receives undue attention because it stands 
out.… [H]ighly selective perception and 
memory shape what comes to mind before we 
make decisions and choices. 
From this explanation, we state a second essential 
element of our EUP: 
Cognitions that lead to a default type 1 
response are not necessarily the cognitions 
found in extant cognitive theories of IT use. 
We note several other essential elements and related 
insights from our EUP after we further elaborate the 
cognitive control problem in the next section. 
3.2 The Cognitive Control Problem: 
Further Elaboration 
Figure 4 summarizes the cognitive control problem 
and the discussion of intervention by type 2 processes 
to override the default type 1 response generated at the 
time that the context for IT use evokes the type 1 
processes. Note that Figure 4 focuses on immediate 
factors that affect the generation of type 1 and type 2 
responses. It omits learning and past behavior, which 
Figure 3 shows. These omissions simplify Figure 4. 
Nevertheless, learning and past behavior are part of the 
context of Figure 4 and part of the discussion that 
follows.
Fast and Slow Processes Underlying Theories of Information Technology Use  
 
12 
 
 
Figure 4. Default Type 1 Processes and Intervention by Type 2 Processes2 
Type 1 processes quickly generate a default response 
through unconscious selective attention to cognitions 
and without demands on limited working memory. The 
basic type 1 responses are decisions to use or not use 
the target IT. Variations of interest to organizations 
that seek to address the underutilization of IT assets 
include decisions to learn to use the target IT or not 
learn it. Based on considering the type 1 response in 
conjunction with motivational factors and cognitive 
resources, a potential for intervention by type 2 
processes occurs. As we note above, motivational 
factors that affect intervention potential include 
instructions that guide the individual making the 
decision and the individual’s confidence in an intuitive 
decision or feeling how right it is. Cognitive resources 
include time and working memory, both of which are 
limited due to the demands of competing tasks, which 
suggests bounded rationality. If the intervention 
potential is high enough (i.e., exceeds some 
                                                     
2 Type 1 processes (above the dotted line) and type 2 processes (below the dotted line) are subject to bounded rationality; unconscious selective 
attention to cognitions determines type 1 response; cognitions that lead to type 2 response may be few with short casual paths. See Figures 2 and 3 
for additional perspectives; this snapshot of type 1 and type 2 processes does not show learning or other influences on these processes. 
intervention threshold), type 2 processes generate a 
type 2 response. We expect that an individual who 
faces a novel IT without instruction would have little 
confidence in any type 1 response and, thus, a high 
potential to think through the decision, which will lead 
to a type 2 response. At automatic use, when learning 
is high, we expect the cognitions that generate a type 1 
response to reflect both repeated decisions and 
repeated use; thus, we also expect the confidence in 
that response to be high and intervention potential to 
be low. Between these extremes, as learning occurs, 
we expect the intervention potential for a type 2 
response to decline as one moves away from the novel 
IT extreme. Type 2 responses are similar in nature to 
type 1 responses (e.g., they include decisions to use (or 
not use) the target IT).  
The use of limited information in generating a type 1 
default response suggests that bounded rationality 
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constraints apply to type 1 processes. Shleifer (2012) 
views the version of bounded rationality that leads to 
type 1 choices as different from Simon’s (1976) 
version, which leads to satisficing choices. For 
example, as a result of bounded rationality, type 1 
processes may ignore more critical information and 
focus on less relevant information that stands out and, 
thus, result in a type 1 response that may be overridden 
by intervening type 2 processes; in contrast, Simon’s 
(1976) bounded rationality focuses on a few most 
relevant and crucial factors that result in an acceptable 
choice. Nevertheless, both type 1 and satisficing 
processes use limited information or cognitions and are 
completed in a limited time. In the context of the 
cognitive control problem, overriding a type 1 
response requires additional cognitive processing, 
takes additional time, and competes with other tasks 
that put demands on a constrained working memory. 
Thus, intervention by type 2 processes requires extra 
effort beyond type 1 processing regardless of where the 
individual is along the continuum of IT use from initial 
use to automatic use.  
Given the reliance of type 2 processes on working 
memory, with its limited capacity, bounded rationality 
constraints apply even more to type 2 processes than 
type 1 processes, which do not rely on working 
memory. Limited cognitive resources constrain the 
information or cognitions considered in the decision to 
use IT. Type 2 processes and associated resources 
compete with other task demands for working 
memory. They are also time constrained. We expect 
that, together, these constraints typically lead to 
cognitively simplified, acceptable decisions rather than 
cognitively complex, optimal decisions. Cognitions 
used to guide decisions to use IT may be few with short 
causal paths. For example, the experienced sales 
associate might think: “It will take me too long to learn 
to use the greater IT inventory functionality. It’s not 
worth it now.”. The new sales associate might think: 
“I’m going to have enough of these unusual orders in 
the future that I need to learn more about that part of 
the IT”.  
Even though we illustrate the influence of type 1 
processes in Figure 2 as progressing linearly, this 
increasing influence may not follow a linear 
progression. Indeed, future research needs to 
investigate how this increasing influence does 
progress. Researchers who conduct such work may 
find interest in Benlian’s (2015) research, which found 
a non-linear pattern of IT feature use over time. 
Example questions research could investigate include: 
“What causes the confidence in default type 1 
responses to increase rapidly (or slowly) and, thereby, 
affect intervention potential?”, “Does increasing skill 
in using the IT increase the perceived time and working 
memory available and, thereby, affect intervention by 
slower type 2 processes?”, “What kinds of 
instructional cues lead to greater intervention 
potential?”, and “Is the intervention threshold fixed, or 
what factors lead to changes in it?”. 
Our explanations of type 1 and type 2 processes and 
the cognitive control problem that we present above, 
all of which Figures 2 to 4 graphically represent, 
contain several essential elements and related insights. 
Besides those that we summarize above, they include: 
• Slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) cognitive 
processes are more likely to intervene to reinforce 
or override the default fast, automatic, 
unconscious (type 1) cognitive response when 
there is little or no learning from prior use of the 
target IT (which includes similar IT) or related 
instruction. Thus, type 2 processes are dominant 
over type 1 processes when there is little or no 
prior use of the target IT. 
• Type 2 processes are less likely to intervene to 
reinforce or override the default type 1 response as 
learning occurs. Thus, the influence of type 2 
processes decreases as learning occurs via prior 
decisions to use IT and via actual use of the IT. 
• Type 2 processes are unlikely to intervene to 
reinforce or override the default type 1 response 
when high learning has occurred from prior use of 
IT. Thus, type 1 processes dominate type 2 
processes when there is extensive learning. 
• In the cognitive control problem, intervention 
potential represents the likelihood of intervention. 
When the intervention potential is high enough 
(i.e., exceeds the intervention threshold), type 2 
processes intervene. The relationship between 
extent of learning (or prior use) and intervention 
potential may not be linear.  
• Both type 1 and type 2 processes are subject to 
bounded rationality. 
3.3 Comparison with Elaboration 
Likelihood Model and Self-
regulation 
Another dual-process theory that could potentially 
provide insights for the cognitive control problem is 
the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) that 
Bhattacherjee and Sanford (2006) introduced to the IS 
literature. It includes type 1 processes, referred to as 
the peripheral route, which involve little cognitive 
effort (i.e., low elaboration) and type 2 processes, 
referred to as the central route, which involve 
thoughtful information processing (i.e., high 
elaboration). Bhattacherjee and Sanford’s (2006) 
explanation of ELM does not include a default 
response by the peripheral route (type 1 processes) 
with potential intervention by the central route (type 2 
processes). Instead, ELM suggests that those who 
receive information about an IT are more likely to 
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engage type 2 processes if the information is 
personally relevant and they have the expertise or 
ability to evaluate it; otherwise, they will rely on 
peripheral cues, such as source credibility, via type 1 
processes. Thus, the theoretical foundation for this 
version of ELM and our explanation of underlying 
processes differ on the role of type 1 and type 2 
processes in the cognitive control problem. Kitchen, 
Kerr, Schultz, McColl, and Pals (2014) provide a broad 
review of ELM that should be useful for future 
researchers who wish to more thoroughly compare 
ELM and our explanation. 
The IS literature also has references to self-regulation, 
which involves reasoning processes (i.e., type 2 
processes) that could confirm or override a type 1 
response (Soror, Hammer, Steelman, Davis, & Moez, 
2015). Given the potential relevance of self-regulation 
in addressing the cognitive control problem, we briefly 
discuss the implications of self-regulation for our 
explanation of fast, automatic, unconscious (type 1) 
and slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) processes in 
determining use of IT. Soror et al. (2015) discuss self-
regulation in conjunction with type 1 processes, which 
they refer to as the reflexive or automatic system, and 
type 2 processes, which they refer to as the reflective 
system. In our explanation of underlying processes, the 
cognitive control problem occurs when an individual 
is anywhere on the continuum of IT use from initial use 
to continuing use and to automatic use. Soror et al.’s 
(2015) discussion of self-regulation places the 
individual at only automatic (or habitual) use; thus, 
self-regulation involves the reflective system’s 
intervening only at the point of automatic use rather 
than along the continuum of use prior to that. Self-
regulation overrides the reflexive system response of 
habitual behavior (e.g., reading a text when notified of 
an incoming message) that conflicts with an 
established goal (e.g., driving safely). In Soror et al.’s 
(2015) discussion, self-regulation is more limited in 
scope than the cognitive control problem. Future 
researchers interested in more thoroughly comparing 
self-regulation with our explanation of type 1 and type 
2 processes may find it useful to review Lord, 
Diefendorff, Schmidt, and Hall (2010). 
4 Discussion 
Traditionally, a linear model of the moderating effects 
of past behavior with an interaction term (e.g., see 
Figure 1 and Equation 1) has been used in empirical 
investigations of theories of IT use that include previous 
interaction with a target IT. This traditional approach to 
testing theories of IT use has several limitations. We 
identify these limitations here and provide a broad set of 
suggestions for future researchers to consider as they 
investigate our explanation of the processes underlying 
theories of IT use.  
Consider the portion of Figure 1 represented in Equation 
1 along with Figures 2 to 4. The traditional approach to 
empirically testing theories of IT use reflected in Figure 
1 and Equation 1 includes the following representations 
or assumptions: 
• Type 2 processes (as Figures 2 and 3 show) are 
represented by cognitions typically found in 
theories of IT use. (Beyond intention to use target 
IT (INT), which is the only cognition used for 
illustrative purposes in Equation 1, many 
cognitions are used in testing theories of IT use.) 
• Learning (or the repetitive effects of 1) decisions to 
use target IT and 2) use of target IT) is reflected in 
prior behavior with target IT (PAST in Equation 1). 
• Learning is also reflected in a decline in the 
influence of type 2 processes (and the concomitant 
increase in influence of type 1 processes as 
represented in Figure 2). Figure 1 represents this 
changing influence as moderating effects of prior 
behavior with target IT. Equation 1 illustrates a 
traditional moderating effect with the influence of 
intention to use target IT (INT) on use of target IT 
(USE) declining as past behavior with target IT 
(PAST) increases. This moderating effect would be 
empirically confirmed if b3 (the coefficient of the 
interaction (INT*PAST) in Equation 1) were 
negative. With this traditional conceptual and 
corresponding statistical model of the moderating 
effect of past behavior, the decline in influence is 
linearly related to the increase in learning.  
Given our EUP, however, the traditional approach to 
empirically testing theories of IT use reflected in Figure 
1 and Equation 1 includes the following limitations: 
• It does not include type 1 processes except as a 
complement to type 2 processes (see the last bullet 
above), and that form of inclusion does not specify 
a default type 1 response (or how it would be 
generated). Related to this basic omission, the 
traditional approach does not take into account the 
potential intervention of type 2 processes. It also 
does not take into account the insight from our EUP 
that cognitions that lead to a default type 1 response 
are not necessarily the cognitions found in 
cognitive theories of IT use. Thus, if cognitions that 
lead to a default type 1 response are not the relevant 
cognitions that traditional theories such as TAM, 
TPB, or UTAUT identify but instead are “less 
relevant” information that “receives undue 
attention because it stands out”, traditional theories 
of IT use and approaches to investigating them are 
unlikely to discover or confirm those type 1 
cognitions. 
• Using the traditional moderating effect approach to 
take into account learning (or the shifting influence 
of type 1 and type 2 processes along the continuum 
of IT use) does not take into account the insight 
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from our EUP that the declining influence of type 2 
processes as learning increases is not necessarily 
linear. 
•  The traditional approach does not take into account 
the insight from our EUP that type 1 and type 2 
processes are subject to bounded rationality. In a 
traditional theory of IT use, the cognitions 
associated with that theory are presumably all the 
relevant cognitive influences on a decision to use a 
target IT. One implication of bounded rationality, 
however, would be that cognitive resources (e.g., 
time and working memory) are constrained and so 
are the cognitions. Only a few cognitions, rather 
than all of those in the theory, are likely to be 
considered. In addition, other aspects of bounded 
rationality (e.g., selective perception or biases) may 
result in an individual’s considering cognitions that 
are less relevant or otherwise differing from those 
in extant theories. 
Given the limitations above, the traditional approach to 
testing theories of IT use does not provide an appropriate 
empirical test of our explanation of processes that 
underlie a decision to use IT. Building on the essential 
elements of our EUP and related insights, future 
researchers could develop and test new variance models 
that address the limitations of the traditional models to 
explain initial, continued, and automatic use of targeted 
IT, which would result in substantially new research. 
For example, researchers need to explore how to 
incorporate type 1 and type 2 processes into new 
variance models together with their shifting influence on 
use of IT as learning from repetitive use occurs. 
Researchers could consider including learning explicitly 
in new variance models rather than inferring it from the 
moderating effect of past behavior as has been done 
traditionally. The relationship between learning and use 
of IT could be modeled to reflect the insight that it may 
not be linear.  
Beyond research on variance explained, researchers 
could develop new avenues of research by investigating 
processes. For example, they could explore the 
generation of type 1 responses. That includes 
investigations related to two insights from our EUP; 
namely, investigations of how cognitions leading to a 
default type 1 response differ from cognitions found in 
current cognitive theories of IT use and the effects of 
bounded rationality on generation of a type 1 response. 
Research on the process of generating type 1 responses 
could also explore the effectiveness of various decision- 
making heuristics that those facing decisions to use IT 
use—especially those who are underutilizing it. The 
work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) could be one 
model for inspiring a program of research in this area. 
Another avenue for developing process research would 
be to examine the intervention of type 2 processes (i.e., 
the cognitive control problem). As part of that 
examination, researchers could investigate the effects of 
bounded rationality on type 2 processes. Beyond being 
guided by Figure 4 and our related discussion, future 
researchers could also find guidance in Evans’ (2011) 
discussion about “the intervention model”. 
4.1 Implication for Separate Theories 
of Initial, Continuing, and 
Automatic Use of IT 
Our theoretical explanation provides a simpler, more 
parsimonious explanation of IT use than multiple 
theories. Ortiz de Guinea and Markus (2009, p. 441) 
argue that continuing IT use may be “far less 
intentional and far more automatic than the IS 
literature would lead one to presume”. They claim that 
future research should not focus on intentions or 
decisions but rather on behavior and that reason-based 
models, including TAM and the theory of planned 
behavior (TPB), “are probably not the most useful 
theoretical foundations for studies of continuing IT 
use, however valuable they may be for understanding 
initial IT adoption decisions and technology 
replacement decisions”. This position echoes that of 
other researchers (e.g., Jasperson et al., 2005; 
Karahanna et al., 1999). These authors are basically 
arguing for two different theories of use: one for initial 
or novel use that includes intentions with its cognitive 
antecedents and one for continuing and automatic use 
that omits such constructs. Our explanation with two 
types of cognitive processes that shift in influence as 
an individual moves from initial to automatic use 
provides a single explanation of IT use that applies to 
initial use and to continuing and automatic use. 
4.2 Addressing the Underutilization of 
IT Assets 
In this paper, we explain default type 1 cognitive 
processes (fast, automatic, unconscious) and 
potentially intervening type 2 cognitive processes 
(slow, controlled, conscious) that are engaged as 
individuals along the continuum of IT use determine 
their next use of a specific IT. This explanation has 
implications for organizations that seek to better use 
their IT assets. These implications include directions 
for future research that would provide answers to 
questions these organizations would like answered and 
practical advice these organizations can implement 
now. We discuss these implications next. 
4.2.1 Research Implications 
Relevant questions for guiding future research include 
how to facilitate an intervention of type 2 processes 
when the type 1 response is not to use the IT and how 
to facilitate a type 2 response to use the IT. Shleifer 
(2012) notes that a common tactic is to provide 
education. Making information available to guide 
decision making behavior (Ölander & Thøgersen, 
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2014) is a similar tactic. However, Shleifer (2012) 
suggests that, to be most effective, education should 
focus on affecting type 1 processes since they provide 
the initial response regarding use. Similarly, Ölander 
and Thøgersen (2014) suggest paying attention to the 
heuristics (i.e., type 1 processing) people use when 
processing information. Thus, another relevant 
research question would be how to facilitate a type 1 
response to use the IT. In other words, what cognitions 
of the potential IT user should one target and how can 
one selectively evoke them?  
Previous research on type 1 processes, which has been 
conducted outside the context of the decision to use IT, 
suggests that structuring the context leading to a type 
1 response (i.e., designing the choice architecture 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008)) can influence the response. 
Ölander and Thøgersen (2014, p. 344) note that 
nudging (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) “has become an 
umbrella term” for “many heuristics, often taking the 
form of biases, which we seem to apply in much 
decision-making and which make us susceptible to the 
influence of contextual cues”. They note several 
heuristics, such as anchoring, availability, 
representativeness, framing, priming, loss aversion, 
follow the herd, status quo, and path of least resistance. 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) recommend designing a 
choice architecture that includes a default choice. For 
example, a default choice could nudge the decision 
maker to select the status quo or the path of least 
resistance. Ölander and Thøgersen (2014) note that the 
“status quo bias and the related ‘path of least 
resistance’…is one of the most utilized heuristics in the 
choice architecture associated with nudging”. 
Organizations that desire to increase IT use would 
prefer to nudge decision makers to use or at least learn 
to use the IT, but that may not be the status quo or path 
of least resistance. Future researchers could explore the 
applicability and effectiveness of various heuristics 
and nudges in the context of organizations that seek to 
better use their IT assets. Beyond the earlier suggestion 
for researchers to find inspiration from Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1974) work, we also suggest that 
bounded rationality constraints will limit education, 
provision of information, or default choices that 
involve increasing awareness of biases or taking time 
to address such biases; thus, we encourage researchers 
to conduct research that carefully evaluates the 
effectiveness of such interventions. 
Most previous cognitive-based research on technology 
acceptance and use has focused on type 2 processes. 
Although that research has led to recommendations 
such as to design systems to be easy to use, enjoyable, 
and useful, to deliver education or information to 
encourage learning and use of the IT, and to provide 
task and social support for learning and using the IT, 
that research has not recognized limited cognitive 
resources (i.e., bounded rationality). Future 
researchers could explore how bounded rationality 
modifies such recommendations, particularly for 
organizations that seek to better utilize their IT assets. 
As Sun et al. (2016) note, choosing to adopt IT that is 
not relevant for a task (i.e., choosing an IT that is a poor 
fit) could result in a substantial waste of time and 
resources. Thus, a decision not to use an irrelevant IT 
could be a worthwhile outcome of the choice process 
for individuals who are underutilizing IT. As we note 
above, future research could examine how to facilitate 
a response to use a target IT; moreover, valuable future 
research could examine how to avoid adopting IT with 
a poor fit. 
4.2.2 Practical Implications 
Although our theory has implications for designing 
systems, providing task and social support, and 
delivering education or information, we limit our 
suggestions here to the common tactic of delivering 
education or information. More specifically, we 
suggest that organizations with underutilized IT assets 
consider education or provision of information 
directed at not only type 2 processes but also type 1 
processes. By directing efforts at type 1 processes, 
organizations would ideally facilitate a default type 1 
response to use or, at minimum, learn to use the IT. 
Given that type 1 and type 2 processes are evoked 
differently and involve different elements, the 
education or provision of information would be 
designed differently to reach these different processes.  
Consider a context in which individuals encountered a 
decision to use an underutilized IT. For example, 
assume the experienced sales associate in the fourth 
scenario had to take physical inventory and could 
decide to use the basic IT or the IT with greater 
functionality. Rather than a type 1 response to use the 
basic IT, the organization would prefer a type 1 
response to use the IT with greater functionality. To 
evoke the latter response, we suggest regularly 
providing a message, or nudge, in the decision context 
that encouraged the associate to use or learn to use the 
IT with greater functionality. This message could be 
randomly selected from an array of brief, simple, 
subliminal messages that are cognitively unconscious 
(Hassin, 2013) and that a variety of credible sources 
such as individuals’ peers or superiors could deliver. 
The suggestion for brief, simple, and cognitively 
unconscious messages is based on needing to reach 
fast, automatic, unconscious processes that bounded 
rationality tightly constrains. For example, one could 
display a picture of the experienced sales associate and 
the boss high-fiving while the sales associate uses the 
IT with greater functionality. The suggestion for an 
array of different messages is based on the likelihood 
that the context for the decision to use or learn to use 
an underutilized IT will occur frequently rather than 
once or just a few times, so many different messages 
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provide fresh stimuli. One could use one or more of the 
heuristics or biases that we note above to craft message 
content that encourages individuals to use a target IT 
and stands out and that individuals selectively perceive 
when deciding to use the target IT.  Such messages 
ideally would lead to a type 1 response to use the target 
IT.  
Providing education or information to reach type 2 
processes could occur in or beyond the context of a 
decision to use an underutilized IT. Suggestions in the 
context of such a decision would be similar to those 
above for reaching type 1 processes since similar 
constraints apply. Beyond that context, one could 
design interventions to 1) raise the potential for type 2 
processes to intervene when a type 1 response not to 
use the IT occurs and 2) increase the likelihood that the 
intervening type 2 processes will lead to a decision to 
use the IT or at least learn to use the IT. Our theoretical 
clarification implies that one should recognize 
bounded rationality when designing education or 
information for either of these purposes. For example, 
given an individual’s time constraints, one could 
design interventions to provide more time for 
education (e.g., by setting aside time for those who 
underutilize the IT to participate in formal learning of 
high-priority functionality that is a component of the 
underutilized IT). In addition, one could design the 
education, whether formal or informal, to deliver on 
demand the essentials, organized in brief segments, for 
using the functionality of the IT (van Dam, 2012; 
Mayer, 2008). Delivering essentials on demand in brief 
segments recognizes that time is limited and allows 
individuals to learn when they have limited time 
available or when they could pursue learning to help 
them complete a task with the IT’s functionality when 
performing a task. To take advantage of potential 
support from social networks, one could pair or group 
individuals in a cooperative learning design (Johnson, 
Johnson, & Smith, 2007). 
From investigating the research agenda above or the 
effectiveness of interventions that we suggest in the 
practical implications above, researchers could 
develop findings that supplement or modify the 
suggestions that we present here. In the meantime, 
implications from both our theoretical clarification and 
findings from related research provide initial guidance 
for organizations that seek to better utilize their IT 
assets. Further, we limit the scope of our suggestions 
to the common tactic of delivering education or 
information. Others could develop additional 
suggestions beyond this scope. 
5 Conclusion 
Theories of information technology (IT) use have 
helped explain the factors that affect individual 
decisions to use IT; however, organizations need a 
novel perspective to address the continuing 
underutilization of IT assets. In this paper, we provide 
such a perspective. In particular, we explain two 
cognitive processes—type 1 (fast, automatic, 
unconscious) and type 2 (slow, controlled, 
conscious)—that underlie the decision to use IT and 
the shifting influence of those processes as learning 
increases from both repeated decisions to use a target 
IT and repeated use of that IT. All decisions to use IT 
first generate a fast type 1 response, but slow type 2 
processes intervene if the intervention potential is high 
enough.  
An essential element of our explanation of underlying 
processes (EUP) is the relationship between learning 
and the intervention potential (i.e., the likelihood that 
type 2 processes will intervene). We summarize 
specific elements of our EUP that illuminate this 
relationship here. As learning occurs, type 1 and type 
2 processes and related cognitions incorporate the 
effects of that learning. At the left end of the continuum 
of IT use where there is little or no learning from prior 
use of the target (or similar) IT or related instruction, 
slow, controlled, conscious (type 2) cognitive 
processes are more likely to intervene to reinforce or 
override the default fast, automatic, unconscious (type 
1) cognitive response. Thus, slow (type 2) processes 
are dominant at initial use of a target IT. Between the 
extremes of the continuum, as learning increases, the 
likelihood of intervention by slow processes declines. 
At the right end of the continuum where learning is 
high such that a fast (type 1) response is automatic, the 
likelihood of intervention by type 2 processes is 
essentially nil. Thus, fast processes dominate at 
automatic use of a target IT. Although increased 
learning is related to a decline in the intervention 
potential, the relationship between extent of learning 
(or position on the continuum of IT use) and likelihood 
of intervention is not necessarily linear. Future 
research needs to develop and empirically investigate 
new variance and process models of IT use based on 
these essential elements of our EUP. 
Further, we develop two additional insights from our 
EUP. First, type 1 responses are not necessarily based 
on the cognitions found in extant theories of IT use; 
instead, they could be based on less relevant cognitions 
such as those that are selectively evoked because they 
stand out or reflect biases. Second, cognitive 
constraints on type 1 and type 2 processes mean that 
both processes operate under bounded rationality. We 
propose new directions for future research, which 
includes developing and empirically investigating new 
variance and process models that incorporate essential 
elements of our EUP and related insights. We also 
offer practical guidance for organizations that seek to 
better utilize their IT assets. For example, we suggest 
that organizations with underutilized IT assets focus on 
providing education or information to those who face 
decisions concerning their use of underutilized IT; 
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more specifically, we recommend that they develop 
brief, simple, cognitively unconscious messages 
directed at nudging those decision makers toward a 
default response to use the target IT. 
An important contribution that also emerges from our 
EUP is a unifying foundation for previously separate 
theoretical explanations of initial, continuing, and 
automatic use. Overall, our contributions significantly 
advance the field’s conceptual understanding of the 
underlying processes determining use of IT. They also 
open fertile new ground for research in an area that 
needs it. Furthermore, for organizations that seek to 
better utilize IT assets, we provide immediate 
suggestions and hope for future research-based 
recommendations.  
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